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THERE IS NO COMPLETE, IMPLIED, OR FIELD FEDERAL
PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW PERSONAL INJURY/
WRONGFUL DEATH NEGLIGENCE or PRODUCT
LIABILITY CLAIMS IN GENERAL AVIATION CASES
JOHN D. MCCLUNE*
I. SUMMARY
N RECENT LITIGATION against general aviation aircraft
and component manufacturers, arguments have been made
that there is complete, implied, or field federal preemption' of a
plaintiffs state law personal injury and wrongful death claims
involving a general aviation aircraft. Abdullah v. American Air-
lines, Inc., an anomaly commercial airline case discussing opera-
* Mr. McClune is a partner with the law firm of Schaden, Katzman, Lampert &
McClune. He attended Western Michigan University from which he graduated in
1991 lnagna cum laude with a BBA. He obtained his Juris Doctor degree from
the Wayne State University School of Law in Detroit. Mr. McClune specializes in
aviation wrongful death and personal injury litigation.
Complete preemption is said to exist where there is a
congressional intent in the enactment of a federal statute not just
to provide a federal defense to a state created cause of action but to
grant a defendant the ability to remove the adjudication of the
cause of action to a federal court by transforming the state cause of
action into a federal cause of action.
14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3722.1 (3d ed. 2006). Implied preemption exists
where Congress has impliedly precluded state regulation in an area, or when
Congress did not necessarily intend preemption of state regulation in a given
area but the particular state law conflicts directly with federal law or acts as a
barrier to the accomplishment of federal objectives. See generally Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04
(1983). Field preemption exists where a multiplicity of federal statutes or regula-
tions govern and densely intertwine in a given field and the pervasiveness of such
federal laws will help to sustain a conclusion that Congress intended to exercise
exclusive control over the subject matter. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry.
& Motor Coach Employees of Am. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 295-97 (1971).
This author believes the latter two doctrines are essentially different ways of ex-
pressing the same principle.
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tional services, is being used as a basis for this preemption
argument.2
This article explains that both the plain language of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958 ("FAA") 3 and the case law interpreting
the act make clear that the FAA does not completely or im-
pliedly preempt state law actions for negligence and product lia-
bility regarding the design and manufacture of commercial or
general aviation aircraft. There is no federal aviation negli-
gence law in a general aviation product liability action, nor is
there any federal aviation product liability law. In fact, no fed-
eral cause of action is created by the FAA, nor does the FAA
create federal tort remedies. Plaintiffs need not prove violations
of federal law to prove their product liability cause of action.
There is a clear distinction between enacting minimum federal
regulations pertaining to general aviation aircraft and compo-
nent design and manufacture and creating a body of federal
common law foreclosing state rights. States can prescribe more
stringent standards than the minimum federal standards applica-
ble to general aviation aircraft and components designed, man-
ufactured, maintained, or injected into their stream of
commerce, especially since the general aviation aircraft manu-
facturers certify the airworthiness of their own aircraft in com-
pliance with those minimum federal regulations. In light of
these minimum standards and manufacturers' prerogative to
police themselves, there can be no conflict or field preemption.
United States Supreme Court case law addressing preemption
issues, along with aviation case law across the country, confirms
this interpretation. The facts in Abdullah are clearly distinguish-
able from a situation involving the design and manufacture of a
general aviation aircraft and its components. For this and other
reasons explained in this article, Abdullah was wrongly decided.
Courts should not judicially legislate a new general aviation fed-
eral jurisdictional, negligence, or product liability statute.
2 Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999). Abdullah held, in
part, that federal law establishes the applicable standards of care in the field of
aviation safety and preempts the entire field, but the traditional state and territo-
rial law remedies continue to exist for violation of those standards.
3 Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
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II. UNDER THE FAA, THERE IS NO COMPLETE,
IMPLIED, OR FIELD PREEMPTION OF A CLAIMANT'S
STATE LAW NEGLIGENCE, BREACH OF WARRANTY,
OR PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS AGAINST
GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT AND
COMPONENT MANUFACTURERS
The statutory history of the FAA, Supreme Court precedent,
and a uniform body of case law addressing complete, implied,
and field preemption hold that general aviation manufacturers
cannot establish such preemption under the FAA and its
amendments, or even that Congress intended to make tort ac-
tions implicating the FAA removable to federal court. Even in
the commercial airline context, which is more likely to involve
rates, routes, or services of an air carrier, there is no such pre-
emption of personal injury or wrongful death claims.
A. STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE FAA AND ITS AMENDMENTS
The Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") was empowered by Con-
gress in 1938 to regulate the interstate airline industry.'
"[F]rom the start, the FAA has contained a 'saving clause,' stat-
ing: 'Nothing ... in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter
the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the
provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.'5
Although the FAA authorized the CAB to regulate fares and
take administrative action against deceptive trade practices, the
FAA originally contained no clause preempting state regula-
tion.6 In an effort to deregulate the aviation industry in 1978,
Congress amended the FAA by enacting the Airline Deregula-
tion Act ("ADA"), which added an express preemption clause
pertaining to state laws that apply to "rates, routes, or services of
any air carrier. ' 7 The "saving clause" was once again preserved.
As explained by Judge Edmunds in Margolis v. United Airlines,
Inc.:
In [1978], Congress decided to withdraw economic regulation of
interstate airline rates, routes and services. Congress therefore
enacted the . . .ADA . . . "to encourage, develop, and attain an
4 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222 (1995); Margolis v. United
Airlines, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 318, 320 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
5 Wolens, 513 U.S. at 222 (citing FAA § 1106).
6 Id.
7 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 § 105(a) (1978); seeMargolis, 811 F. Supp. at
320; Wolens, 513 U.S. at 222.
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air transportation system which relies on competitive market
forces to determine the quality, variety and price of air services
.... " To avoid the frustration of that goal by the substitution of
state regulations for the recently removed federal regulations,
Congress enacted [Section] 105(a) of the ADA, which preempts
any state law "relating to rates, routes, or services of any air car-
rier having authority . . . to provide air transportation." Section
105(a) of the ADA, the preemption provision, became section
1305(a) of the Federal Aviation Act (FAA) .... Congress also re-
tained the savings clause that preserved common law and statutory
remedies.8
The continued preservation of the "saving clause" clearly indi-
cates that Congress intended state based common law tort reme-
dies to co-exist with the federal statutory scheme.9
B. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASE LAW REGARDING
PREEMPTION AND THE FAA
The Supreme Court has emphasized that when determining
whether a particular field of law is preempted, interpretation
must start with the presumption that preemption is not in-
tended.' ° "[W]here federal law is said to bar state action in
fields of traditional state regulation... we have worked on the
'assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
manifest purpose of Congress."'
Prior to the Court's interpretation of the ADA in Morales v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc.,12 "case law concerning preemption [in
aviation cases] divided fairly neatly between economic or regula-
tory issues and personal injury, damage or negligence issues...
[P]reemption disputes involving traditional personal injury or
negligence claims were almost uniformly resolved against pre-
emption."' 3 In 1992, the Morales Court held that guidelines re-
garding airline fare advertising were expressly preempted by the
ADA amendment to the FAA, which obviously related to rates
8 Margolis, 811 F. Supp. at 320 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also
In reAir Disaster, 819 F. Supp. 1352 (E.D. Mich. 1993), discussed infra.
9 Margolis, 811 F. Supp. at 320. See also In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton
Int'l Airport, 721 F. Supp. 1185, 1187 (D. Colo. 1988).
10 N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 654-55 (1995).
11 Id. at 655 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)).
12 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
13 Margolis v. United Airlines, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 318, 322 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
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within the meaning of FAA § 1305.'" As succinctly stated by the
Court:
In concluding that the NAAG fare advertising guidelines are pre-
empted, we do not ... set out on a road that leads to pre-emp-
tion of state laws against gambling and prostitution as applied to
airlines. Nor need we address whether state regulation of the
non-price aspects of fare advertising ... would "relat[e] to" rates;
the connection would obviously be far more tenuous. To adapt
this case to our language in Shaw, "[slome state actions may af-
fect [airline fares] in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a man-
ner" to have pre-emptive effect.1"
That same year the Court addressed the issue of preemption
of state law product liability and negligence claims under the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc. 6 The Court in Cipollone held that state law
claims based upon design defect, negligence in research and
testing, failure to disclose data regarding health risks to govern-
ment agencies, express warranty, and fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion were not preempted by a federal statute providing express
preemption of state law pertaining to the advertisement and
promotion of any cigarettes. 17 The Court once again declined
to extend preemption into an area which had not been specifi-
cally delineated by Congress."8
In 1995, the Court in American Airlines v. Wolens revisited the
FAA and ADA preemption issue and held that state law breach
of contract claims for retroactive changes in the airline's fre-
quent flyer programs were not preempted, even though they "re-
late[d] to" rates and senice under the FAA and its ADA
amendments.' 9 The majority determined that:
The ADA's preemption clause, [section] 1305(a) (1), read to-
gether with the FAA's saving clause, stops States from imposing
their own substantive standards with respect to rates, routes, or
services, but not from affording relief to a party who claims and
14 Morales, 504 U.S. at 390.
15 Id. (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)). The
Court's holding in Morales has been narrowly construed as limited to fare adver-
tising guidelines and did not open the door for the preemption of other state or
common laws or remedies where "the connection would be more tenuous." Id.
H! Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
17 See id. at 519-31.
' See Margolis, 811 F. Supp. at 323 (discussing Cipollone).
"9 Am. Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 226 (1995).
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proves that an airline dishonored a term the airline itself stipu-
lated [in a contract].2°
The Court in Wolens explained that restricting Morales "makes
sense of Congress' retention of the FAA's savings clause," which
preserved the "remedies now existing at common law or by stat-
ute. ' 21 Neither the FAA nor its ADA amendment intended to
"channel civil actions into federal court. ' 22
The Wolens majority noted that Morales should not be consid-
ered so broadly as to preempt such personal injury or wrongful
death claims as those arising from a plane crash.23 In fact,
American Airlines, as well as the United States as amicus curiae,
admitted to the Court that state law personal injury and wrong-
ful death claims would not be preempted as they pertain to the
maintenance or operation of the aircraft.24
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, ex-
plained that based upon Congress' retention of the saving
clause and the Court's prior Cipollone opinion, neither state law
fraud nor breach of contract claims are preempted by the FAA
or its ADA amendments, 25 which would likewise hold true for
personal injury and wrongful death claims. Justice O'Connor,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, proposed a broader
view of preemption than both the majority and Justice Stevens.26
Even still, Justice O'Connor, citing Judge Rosen's opinion in In
re Air Disaster and many other authorities cited herein, expressly
noted that personal injury and wrongful death claims would not
be preempted.27
20 Id. at 232-33.
21 Id. at 232.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 231 n.7, 234-38.
24 Id. at 231 n.7.
25 See id. at 235-37.
26 Id. at 242-43.
27 Id.; see In reAir Disaster, 819 F. Supp. 1352, 1363 (E.D. Mich. 1993). See also
Gee v. Sw. Airlines, 110 F.3d 1400, 1406 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds,
Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that
"the Supreme Court in Wolens clearly indicated that Morales should not be ex-
tended to preempt personal injury safety-related negligence claims, as reflected
in the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions"). In 1996, the Court in
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr held that an express preemption provision in the 1976
Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did
not preempt plaintiffs' common law claims of negligent design and manufactur-
ing against the manufacturer of an allegedly-defective pacemaker. Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). The Court emphasized once again that the
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C. THE DELEGATED OPTION AUTHORITY AND THE GENERAL
AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT OF 1994 MAKE CLEAR THERE IS
No COMPLETE, IMPLIED, OR FIELD PREEMPTION OF STATE
PRODUCT LIABILITY, NEGLIGENCE, BREACH OF WARRANTY,
AND FAILURE TO WARN CLAIMS INVOLVING
GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT
The Delegated Option Authority ("DOA"), pursuant to which
the Federal Aviation Administration (the "Administration") per-
mits aircraft manufacturers to type certify their own aircraft dur-
ing the design and manufacture process, supports the
conclusion that such manufacturers should remain open to lia-
bility under state law.28 Under the DOA process, the Adminis-
tration establishes minimum safety regulations for the design
and manufacture of aircraft and then relies upon the manufac-
turers' representations of compliance with the standards.2 '
Manufacturers essentially fill two oft opposing roles during de-
sign and manufacture: that of a manufacturer and that of an
Administration inspector." It could be said that "the fox is
watching the henhouse" through type certification. Because the
Administration is immune from liability in this manufacturing
process, plaintiffs are left without a remedy if state law causes of
action against manufacturers are preempted by the FAA.
In United States v. Varig Airlines, a case involving a tort action
brought against the Administration for negligent certification of
an aircraft, the Supreme Court held that, pursuant to the discre-
tionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, the
Administration was immune from liability because it was the
manufacturer who actually certified that the aircraft complied
with the minimum safety regulations, not the Administration:"
As explained by the Court:
[The] certification process is founded upon a relatively simple
notion: the duty to ensure that an aircraft conforms to [Adminis-
States' historic police powers cannot be superseded by a federal act absent Con-
gress' clear and manifest purpose. Id. at 485.
28 See 14 C.F.R. pts. 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35 (2006).
29 Id.
"I See also MARY SCHIAVO, FLYING BLIND FLYING SAFE: THE FORMER INSPECTOR
GENERAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION TELLS You EvERYTHING
You NEED TO KI\OW TO TRAVEL SAFER BY AIR 51-52, 177-184 (1997) (indicating
that the FAA works for the aviation industry as opposed to the flying public; the
manufacturers typically police themselves and certify their own products, as the
FAA engineers typically have less training and experience than their counterparts
in the industry).
31 United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 815-16 (1984).
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tration] safety regulations lies with the manufacturer... while the
[Administration] retains the responsibility for policing compli-
ance. Thus, the manufacturer is required to develop the plans
and specifications and perform the inspections and tests neces-
sary to establish that an aircraft design comports with the applica-
ble regulations; the [Administration] then reviews the data for
conformity purposes by conducting a "spot check" of the manu-
facturer's work.
... [B] ecause "[Administration] engineers cannot review each of
the thousands of drawings, calculations, reports, and tests in-
volved in the type certification process," the agency must place
great reliance on the manufacturer . . . . "[I] n most cases the
[Administration] staff performs only a cursory review of the sub-
stance of th[e] overwhelming volume of documents" submitted
for its approval.32
Additionally, in 1994 Congress enacted the General Aviation
Revitalization Act ("GARA"), an eighteen year statute of repose
with express exceptions and re-tolling provisions that further
demonstrates that state law claims are still available to plain-
tiffs.3" Under section 2(b) (1) of GARA, an exception to the re-
pose statute exists if a general aviation aircraft manufacturer
knowingly misrepresents, or conceals or withholds, required in-
formation from the Administration during type certification,
when such misrepresentation or omission is an alleged causal
factor in a crash.3 4 A failure to notify the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 21.3 and applicable law re-
garding "obligations with respect to continued airworthiness" of
an aircraft and its components is an exception to GARA.35
The plain language of GARA, and its statutory history, make
clear that the GARA repose statute is just that: a statute of re-
pose only. It did not attempt to create a body of federal general
aviation product liability law like its predecessor bills; state law
32 Varg, 467 U.S. at 816-17, 818 n.14 (emphasis added) (quoting NAT'L RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, CoMMiTTEE OF FAA AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES,
IMPROVING AIRCRAFr SAFETY 6, 29-32 (1980), http://www.nap.edu/openbook/03
09030919/html/Rl.html).
33 General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat.
1552 (1994) (amended 1997).
34 Id. § 2(b)(1).
35 Id.; 14 C.F.R. § 21.3 (2006) (requiring general aviation aircraft manufactur-
ers to report to the FAA malfunctions, defects, and failures). See also Robinson v.
Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d 631, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2004). GARA also
does not apply when the manufacturer acts in any other capacity, or when the
component parts at issue have been replaced or updated within the eighteen year
period.
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remedies remain intact. ' GARA was the sole surviving remnant
of much larger and detailed proposals pertaining to products
liability and general aviation that were considered by the 100th,
101st and 102nd Congresses. 7
For example, in the 100th Congress a general aviation prod-
uct liability bill was introduced to establish uniform federal stan-
dards on a number of issues, such as joint and several liability,
standards of care, statutes of repose, and punitive damages.3
The bill never made it to the House floor. In the 101st Con-
gress, Second Session, the "General Aviation Accident Liability
Standards Act of 1989" was proposed, which would have estab-
lished federal subject matter jurisdiction for general aviation
negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty claims.39 The
proposed legislation also would have established standards for
liability, rules of comparative responsibility, time limitations,
and limitations on damage remedies.4" But once again, Con-
gress could not obtain support for the creation of a federal
cause of action for general aviation accidents. Thereafter, in
1992, H.R. 5362 was proposed in the Second Session of the
102nd Congress.4' The bill, similar to those above, also would
have created federal subject matter jurisdiction over general avi-
ation cases, overhauled the substantive requirements of a negli-
gence action, prescribed new criteria for determining
comparative responsibility, established evidentiary rules, speci-
fied requirements for punitive damage claims, and created a
federal statute of limitations.42 Like its predecessors, this at-
tempt to preempt the entire field of general aviation and create
a federal cause of action failed. GARA is the sole remnant of
that prior legislation.
Judge Edmunds explains in Wright v. Bond Air, Ltd., a case
handled elsewhere by the author, that GARA merely serves a
"gatekeeping function":
GARA is a statute of repose and merely serves a gatekeeping
function for Plaintiff's state law cause of action. There is nothing
'16 GARA § 2(a)-(b). See also Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd., 930 F. Supp. 300, 305
(E.D. Mich. 1996).
37 140 CoNG. REc. 10, 14469 (1994).
38 S. 473, 100th Cong. (1988).
:'9 General Aviation Accident Liability Standards Act of 1989, S. 640, 101st
Cong. (1990).
40 See id.
41 General Aviation Standards Act of 1989, H.R. 5362, 102d Cong. (1992).
42 See id.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
in GARA's legislative history to support an argument that Con-
gress intended GARA to create a body of federal common law.
Nor does the Act preempt a state's substantive law regarding neg-
ligence or breach of warranty claims. Rather, GARA is narrowly
drafted to preempt only state law statutes of limitation or repose
that would permit lawsuits beyond GARA's 18 year limitation pe-
riod in circumstances where its exceptions do not apply.43
D. COMMERCIAL AND GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT CASE LAW
ACROSS THE COUNTRY INDICATE No FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF
GENERAL AVIATION PRODUCT LIABILITY, NEGLIGENCE,
BREACH OF WARRANTY, AND FAILURE TO WARN CLAIMS
No preemption of state law involving a general aviation air-
craft is found in Abdullah. That case involved the commercial
airline operational context only, which is clearly more likely to
impact the ADA's "rates, routes, or services" express preemption
provision, and did not entail a general aviation negligence or
product liability cause of action.44 Other jurisdictions, led by
the Tenth Circuit decision in Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft, Corp.,
uniformly agree that state law negligence and product liability
claims in the general aviation context are not preempted by fed-
eral law.45
Recently, in Monroe v. Cessna Aircraft Co., a general aviation
case, the Eastern District of Texas held that the FAA did not
preempt the entire field of aviation safety.46 The court ex-
plained that the certification process for general aviation air-
craft, as set forth in the federal aviation regulations, did not
create a pervasive regulatory scheme demonstrating intent by
Congress to preempt either the field of aviation safety or state
defective design claims.47 The court held:
The certification process provides the [Administration] with a
mechanism to ensure that aircraft are in compliance with the
safety and design standards set out in other regulations. The reg-
ulations that do control the design and safety of an aircraft are
43 Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd., 930 F. Supp. 300, 305 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
- SeeADA § 105(a).
45 See Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft, Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1445 (10th Cir.) (tort
claim for defective aircraft design was not pre-empted), cert. den., 510 U.S. 908
(1993); see also Holliday v. Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1396 (D.
Haw. 1990); Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft, 691 P.2d 630, 634-35 (Cal. 1984), cert.
den., 471 U.S. 1110 (1985); McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983).
46 Monroe v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 824 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
47 Id. at 833.
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broad and provide a non-exhaustive list of minimum require-
ments leaving discretion to the manufacturer.48
Comparing Abdullah with Cleveland, the court explained:
Cleveland is more consistent with the facts of the present case in
that it involves an individual bringing claims against a general
aviation manufacturer for negligence and design defects,
whereas Abdullah involves claims brought by commercial airline
passengers against a large commercial airline carrier for personal
injury. 49
The Monroe court found that Congress's adoption of GARA to
preempt state tort law pertaining to statutes of repose only indi-
cates its recognition of the continued viability of state tort claims
following adoption of the act.
51
Addressing claims against aircraft manufacturers, the Elev-
enth Circuit in Public Health Trust v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., citing
Morales and Cippollone, held that the FAA does not preempt state
negligence and strict product liability claims. 5' The court wisely
observed that the FAA does not implicitly preempt common law
claims for design defects because it specifically limits its applica-
tion to those claims that have a connection with or reference to
airline rates, routes, or services.52
In the airline context, the Margolis court duly explained that
Congress has demonstrated no intent, express or implied, to
preempt traditional state law claims for negligence or personal
injury by the FAA or its ADA amendments.53 "To the contrary,
the [FAA] retains a savings clause addressed specifically to 'the
remedies now existing at common law.' ""5 Margolis explained
that if the FAA did preempt state law negligence claims, injured
plaintiffs and their decedents would be left without a remedy
since there was no federal cause of action created by the FAA,
nor any federal remedies.5 The Margolis court also noted that if
complete preemption existed, federal regulations mandating
48 Id.
4,9 Id. at 835.
50 Id. at 830.
5 Public Health Trust v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291, 295 (11th Cir.
1993).
5'2 Id.
53 Margolis v. United Airlines, Inc, 811 F. Supp. 318, 323 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 324.
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airline insurance coverage for personal injury or death would be
rendered nugatory.56
The court in In re Air Disaster, a commercial airline case, held
that the FAA did not preempt state law claims of negligence and
gross negligence, and did not confer limited removal jurisdic-
tion on the federal courts. 57 Citing the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Morales and the Margolis decision discussed above, Judge
Rosen stated:
Plaintiffs' negligence/gross negligence claims relate to airline
services in too tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner to war-
rant preemption under Section 1305 [of the FAA].
The Court acknowledges that there are detailed and extensive
regulations regarding training of crews, operation at airports
with control towers, and collision avoidance precautions, all of
which are implicated in Plaintiffs' three negligence/gross negli-
gence counts. However, Plaintiffs do not allege in their Com-
plaint that the Defendants should be held to a different standard
of care than that prescribed in the regulations, such that pre-
emption due to a conflict between state and federal law arises.
Thus, the Court does not find . .. a sufficient basis for finding
that Plaintiffs' negligence and gross negligence claims are pre-
empted ... .58
Many jurisdictions also agree, in the airline context, that the
FAA and the ADA do not preempt state law personal injury
claims of negligence or product liability, nor rules relating to
punitive damages in commercial airlines cases.59
56 Id.
57 In reAir Disaster, 819 F. Supp. 1352, 1364-66 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
58 Id. at 1363-64 (citations omitted). See also Am. Airlines, Inc. v, Wolens, 513
U.S. 219, 241-42 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). In Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. FederalExpress Corp., 89 F.3d 1244,
1252 (6th Cir. 1996), a fraud and misrepresentation action brought by a shipper
against an air freight carrier, the Sixth Circuit held that although state law fraud
claims are preempted by the ADA, "in light of evidence that Congress intended
. . no federal civil remedy [under the FAA and its ADA amendments], we will
not use the savings clause to create such a remedy under the rubric of 'federal
common law."'
59 E.g., Gee v. Sw. Airlines, 110 F.3d 1400, 1406-07 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on
other grounds, Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (9th
Cir. 1998); Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1995);
Smith v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 344, 346-47 (5th Cir. 1995); Lathigra v.
British Airways PLC, 41 F.3d 535, 540 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Mexico City Aircrash,
708 F.2d 400, 406-07 (9th Cir. 1983); In reAir Crash Disaster atJohn F. Kennedy
Int'l Airport, 635 F.2d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1980); In reAir Crash at Charlotte, N.C.,
982 F. Supp. 1056, 1058-59 (D.S.C. 1996); Meinhold v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
949 F. Supp. 758, 762 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Manning v. Skywest Airlines, 946 F. Supp.
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E. ABDULLAH HAS BEEN READILY DISTINGUISHED OR DOUBTED;
ABDULLAH Is NOT APPLICABLE TO GENERAL
AVIATION CASES AND IS IN ERROR
In addition to Monroe, courts continue to distinguish or cast
doubt upon Abdullah. ° One such recent general aviation case
was Sheesley v. Cessna Aircraft Co."' That court expressly rejected
Abdullah in favor of the Cleveland court's reasoning:
The court disagrees with the Third Circuit's conclusion that Con-
gress intended to preempt the field of aviation regulation by
adopting the [FAA]. First, in adopting the [FAA], Congress em-
powered the [Administration] to adopt minimum safety stan-
dards. Minimum standards of aviation safety do not preclude a
finding of negligence where a reasonable person would take ad-
ditional precautions. Additionally, Abdullah does not mention
GARA and its narrow preemption of state tort law affecting avia-
tion safety. In adopting GARA, Congress went to great lengths
limiting its preemption of state tort law in a narrow set of circum-
stances. This would have been unnecessary if Congress had al-
ready preempted all state tort actions affecting aviation safety
when it adopted the [FAA]. Instead, as indicated above, Con-
gress did not intend the [FAA] to preempt the entire field of
767, 773 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Stagl v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 179, 182
(E.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 52 F.3d 463, 466 (2nd Cir. 1995); Curley v.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Fenn v. Am. Airlines,
Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1218, 1222-23 (S.D. Miss. 1993); Sunbird Air Servs., Inc. v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 789 F. Supp. 360, 362-63 (D. Kan. 1992); In re Air Crash
Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 721 F. Supp. 1185, 1187 (D. Colo. 1988); Mc-
Bride v. Gemini Air Cargo, Inc., 915 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005);
Martin v. E. Airlines, Inc., 630 So. 2d 1206, 1208-09 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994);
Knopp v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 357, 362-63 (Tenn. 1996); Cont'l Air-
lines, Inc. v. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d 274, 284 (Tex. 1996).
60 See Hughes v. Attorney Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2004);
Hoagland v. Town of Clear Lake, Ind., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1157 (N.D. Ind.
2004), affd, 415 F.3d 693, 697-700 (7th Cir. 2005); Allen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 301
F. Supp. 2d 370, 377 (E.D. Pa. 2003); In re Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279,
297-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Stone ex rel. Estate of Stone v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 256
F. Supp. 2d 28, 42 (D. Mass. 2002); In re Lawrence W. Inlow Accident Litig., No.
IP 99-0830-C H/G, 2001 WL 331625, at *16 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2001); Skidmore v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. Civ.A.399CV2958G, 2000 WL 1844675, at *2-3 (N.D.
Tex. Dec. 15, 2000); Sakellaridis v. Polar Air Cargo, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 160,
162-63 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Vinnick v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 478
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001); In re Commercial Airfield, 752 A.2d 13, 15 (Vt. 2000);
Miezin v. Midwest Express Airlines, Inc., 701 N.W.2d 626, 629-30 (Wis. Ct. App.
2005).
61 Sheesley v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 2006 'L 1084103 (D.S.D. Apr. 20, 2006).
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aviation safety. After considering both Cleveland and Abdullah,
this court finds Cleveland more persuasive and adopts it here.6 2
As already noted, Abdullah involved a commercial flight and air-
line common carriage, and even if correctly decided its reason-
ing does not apply to general aviation product liability,
negligence, breach of warranty, and failure to warn cases.6 3 The
DOA structure, wherein manufacturers are permitted to police
themselves, mandates this conclusion.6 4 Nevertheless, the rea-
soning in Abdullah is still flawed.
The Abdullah court confused and then intertwined two very
distinct principles: the promulgation of minimum federal regu-
lations pertaining to air transport and the creation of a federal
cause of action or federal common law. It is well established
that merely because a plaintiff alleges, in part, violation of mini-
mum federal regulations, such allegations do not confer federal
question jurisdiction or require federal common law.6 5 There is
no conflict or field preemption when a state prescribes more
stringent standards that would increase safety for commercial
aircraft in its stream of commerce. Abdullah contradicts the FAA
and its history, ignores GARA, and defies an overwhelming body
of case law.
III. CONCLUSION
No federal statute supports complete, implied, or field pre-
emption of the field of general aviation; state tort law and reme-
dies remain intact. In fact, GARA and its legislative history
confirm there is no such preemption. General aviation manu-
facturers should cease to advocate the judicial federalization of
traditional state law. They already enjoy a self-certification pro-
cess, while the industry has admitted there is no such preemp-
tion by supporting the GARA repose statute and its predecessor
preemption bills that were rejected in Congress.6 6 Why should
the several states not be allowed to regulate dangerous and de-
fective general aviation aircraft injected into their stream of
commerce that hurt and kill their domiciliaries, especially if
62 Id. at *22 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
63 See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999).
64 See United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 816 (1984).
65 See Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809 (1986);
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983);
Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd., 930 F. Supp. 300, 305 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
66 See gaig, 467 U.S. at 816; see also 142 Cong. Rec. 4, S5459 (1996) (stating
that "[a]ll [GARA] consisted of was a statute of repose at 18 years for aircraft.
That is all that was in that reform").
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such regulation increases the safety of general aviation aircraft
and components? The truth is, the Tenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution still preserves state sovereignty.
6 7
67 The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. AMEND. X. See also Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924-925 (1997) (striking portions of the Brady Act
that required states to conduct background checks as a violation of the Tenth
Amendment).
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